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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume XXV JUNE, 1940 Number 4
MISSOURI PRACTICE AND THE FEDERAL RULES:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
CARL C. WHEATONt
INTRODUCTION
From time to time man has felt the urge to better his condi-
tion. He has seen a new and more hopeful vision than his former
mental development had enabled him to discern. This evolution
has occurred in legal fields as well as in other spheres of life.
Thus, he has pushed forward into more efficient and just realms
of procedure.
All students of practice know of the slow march of the legal
mind from what might be called the valley of adjective law,
when it was almost a sport, up to the foothills, when lawyers
began to think of procedure as a possible aid to just results.
Surely the minds of Bentham, Livingston, and Field must have
gained those foothills. Perhaps they had travelled far beyond
them. Moreover, they encouraged others who came after them
to toil at improving procedure. Today the more far-sighted
lawyers believe that adjective law should, and must, be used as
a means to attain the nearest approach to fair results in law
suits that imperfect man can reach. A less exalted goal than
that is an unworthy one.
Distinguished results have been reached in several states, but
the best known and advertised late high achievement has been
the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for District
Courts of the United States. The hope of those who have spon-
sored and worked for the adoption of these Rules has been that
IA.B., Leland Stanford, Jr., University, 1911; LL.B., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1915. Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
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they may create such interest and be so appreciated that they,
improved if possible, will become state as well as federal law.
There can be no doubt of three things: first, these Rules are
being thought and talked about in all parts of this country;
second, they are a vast improvement over the practice law of
most jurisdictions; third, unless the state law is changed to coin-
cide to a great extent with the Federal Rules, the lawyers who
practice in state and federal courts are, in most states, going to
be obliged to deal with two procedural systems.
For generations, lawyers and others in Missouri have striven
to improve procedure in the state courts. This state was one of
the first to adopt a system of code pleading. Ever since then,
many of its citizens have endeavored to make more effective the
mode of trying and appealing cases.
The last few years have seen an intensification of these efforts.
They have resulted, for example, in the creation of the Missouri
Institute for the Administration of Justice. Through the efforts
of the members of this Institute and other persons, the 1939
State Legislature invited the Supreme Court of Missouri to sub-
mit to the 1941 session of the Legislature suggestions for a re-
vision of the present code of civil procedure. The Supreme
Court then appointed a committee to aid it in drafting such
suggestions. This committee has very graciously and wisely
called upon the lawyers of the state to send it helpful recommen-
dations. In view of these facts, it will be of some value to com-
pare the present Missouri civil procedure with the new Federal
Rules and to determine whether it would be wise for Missouri
to adopt the Federal Rules, with any possible improvements. If
this can wisely be done, uniformity of procedure in state and
federal courts for the most part will be attained. Such a result
will be a splendid one if it improves our practice and gives us as
fine a system of procedure as we can now obtain. Moreover, we
lawyers shall have but one system of adjective law to learn for
purposes of practice here. This will release time and energy for
use in other profitable fields, and will be of special benefit to
those who are yet to begin the study and practice of law.
At this point, it should be noticed that this discussion applies
not merely to the situation in Missouri, but to that in many other
states which have approximately the same type of civil proce-
dure as exists in Missouri. Let us, therefore, proceed to compare
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss4/2
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the more important Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
apposite practice common to Missouri and many other states.
Reference will be made to Missouri law only, as far as state pro-
cedure is concerned, but similar statutes and rules in other non-
federal jurisdictions will easily be recognized by those practicing
therein.
ONE FORM OF ACTION
Both Rule 21 and Section 696 of the Revised Statutes of Mis-
souri (1929)2 state that there shall be but one form of action
in civil cases. This has been interpreted to mean that, although
the fundamental distinction between law and equity has not
been abolished, the differentiation between names has, on the
whole, been abolished.3 One must still state and prove a cause
of action; but if he fails to allege all the elements of the par-
ticular type of action on which he believes he is suing, he need
not worry so long as he has stated any good cause of action.4
The rule and statute are salutary and should be retained.
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION
In general, Rule 3 and Section 724, as interpreted, are identi-
cal in result, although their wording is not exactly alike. In each
jurisdiction the fling of a complaint or petition commences an
action and stops the running of the statute of limitation. It
would be wise to simplify the state law to read as plainly as does
the Federal Rule. As the statute stands, it must be interpreted
to obtain the result mentioned, for it says the filing of the peti-
tion and the suing out of the process commences the action. It
has been decided that, in the absence of directions to the con-
trary, the filing of a petition amounts to an order to the clerk
of court to issue process.5
PROCESS
Rule 4, relating to process, cannot be used without extensive
change in state procedure because the authority of a state does
1. Rules referred to are Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States.
2. Hereafter, sections of the Revised Statutes of Missouri will be re-
ferred to simply as "Sections."
3. Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co. (D. C. D. Mass. 1939) 30 F.
Supp. 37; Fowles v. Bentley (1909) 135 Mo. App. 417, 115 S. W. 1090.
4. Nester v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1938) 25 F.
Supp. 478.
5. McGrath v. St. Louis, K. C., & Colo. R. R. (1895) 128 Mo. 1, 30 S. W.
329.
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not extend beyond its borders, and because many references to
the federal government and federal agencies do not apply. How-
ever, simple methods of service in cases of individuals and cor-
porations are set forth. These are preferable to the more varied
provisions stated in Chapter 5 of Article 4 of the Missouri
statutes.
Subdivision (e) of Rule 4 appears to refer to published ser-
vice. It says that service provided for by federal statute and
orders of federal courts shall be made in the manner provided
therein. This, of course, cannot be the basis of publication in
state cases. Probably the usual state sgtatutes such as Sections
739, 741, and 747 of the Missouri laws will suffice, though a
careful study should be made to determine whether they can be
improved upon.
TIME
Rule 6 succinctly covers points relating to time and procedure.
This is preferable to the practice in some states which is based
on scattered statutes and cases. Subdivision (d) states that the
expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a
court to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action
which has been pending before it. This appears to change the
rule in many jurisdictions, including Missouri, that a final judg-
ment cannot be set aside after the term at which it is rendered
unless such action is expressly authorized by statute.
Before changing the present state rule, the usefulness of the
change should be carefully considered. The writer favors the
innovation, for he thinks it will lead, on the whole, to cheaper
litigation.
PLEADINGS
A. Availability
Various jurisdictions take different positions concerning the
availability of pleadings. All lawyers recall the theory of the
old rule providing sufficient pleadings finally to reach an issue.0
The new Illinois Civil Practice Act gives the courts permission
to allow pleadings beyond the reply.7 On the other hand in some
procedural systems there is a paucity of permissible pleadings.
Rule 7 allows complaints and answers, but replies are avail-
able only when an answer contains a counterclaim denominated
6. State ex rel. Maple v. Mulloy (1929) 322 Mo. 281, 15 S. W. (2d) 809.
7. (1933) sec. 32; Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1936) c. 110, sec. 156.
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as such, and when a court orders a reply. Cross-claims by one
party against a co-party and third-party complaints by a de-
fendant against one not yet a party, together with answers and
ordered replies to third-party answers, are also permitted. De-
murrers and the old equitable pleas and exceptions are abolished.
In their places motions and answers are provided. Rule 22
permits interpleader and Rule 24 authorizes intervention.
In Missouri, we have petitions, answers, replies (unrestricted
in use), demurrers, and motions.8 Cross-claims by one party
against the other are not permitted unless the cross-claim is also
against the plaintiff and in aid of the cross-pleader's defense to
the plaintiff's petition. 9 True third-party complaints do not exist
in Missouri. Section 3268 allowing contribution among defen-
dants applies only after judgment in the original action. Section
701 has been interpreted to permit intervention,0 and various
sections of the Revised Statutes of Missouri allow interpleader. 11
The query arises as to what philosophy of permitted pleading
best serves the ends of justice. If many pleadings are allowed,
reaching an issue consumes much time and expense. If a mini-
mum of pleadings is used, the parties may go to trial somewhat
uncertain as to the issues. To the writer, it seems that a rule as
to the number of pleadings should be flexible. A court should be
permitted to determine the matter. He recommends, therefore,
that in remolding the state statute the Federal Rules be changed
to the extent that the court may allow pleadings beyond the
reply. This discretion would seldom need to be used, but the
authority to employ it would exist if special circumstances called
for its exercise.
Cross-complaints and third-party complaints, as above defined,
complaints in intervention and interpleader, together with the
proper later pleadings to these complaints, certainly should be
provided for in state practice. To make the third-party com-
plaints available, the substantive law in the state in which the
alleged claim of one party against another is said to exist would
have to permit such an action. This is true whether a third-
8. R. S. Mo. (1929) c. 5.
9. Campbell v. Spotts (1932) 331 Mo. 974, 55 S. W. (2d) 986.
10. Green v. Conrad (1893) 114 Mo. 651, 21 S. W. 839; State to the Use
of Kendrick v. Hudson (1901) 86 Mo. App. 501.
11. (1929) sees. 1316, 1325, 1332, 1404, 1405, 1407, 2535-2538, 5384, 14390,
14450, 14452.
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party action be brought in a federal or a state court. Adopting
motions in place of demurrers has the advantage of making it
unnecessary to interpret any law giving grounds for demurrer
in order to decide whether the defect plain on the face of the
pleading demurred to is, or is not, included in one of the per-
missible grounds of demurrer.
B. Contents
Facts and Law. Rules 8 through 11 deal generally with the
contents of pleadings. The most important difference between
the Federal Rules and the Missouri pleading statutes involves the
manner of stating one's case or defense. Rule 8 (a) (2) declares
that the complaint shall contain a short and plain statement of
the claim and show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule
8(b) says a party shall state his defenses in short and plain
terms. In contrast to this, the statutes in Missouri and many
other states asserts that a claim shall consist of a plain and
concise statement of the facts constituting the causes of action. 12
In turn, Section 783 says that only the substantive facts neces-
sary to constitute the cause of action or defense shall be stated.
It may be that, if one interprets the Federal Rules by looking
at some of the forms drafted by the committee which aided the
Supreme Court of the United States in formulating the rules, he
may think necessary more complete statements of causes and
defenses than one finds in the forms. However, the tendency
toward too brief notice pleading which one may discover in the
new Rules creates little difficulty compared with the trouble
encountered under state law.
The Missouri rule, for example, is to the effect that one must
state substantive facts constituting causes and defenses. The
impracticability of this formula is, in part, that very often law-
yers and judges do not know the difference between facts and
law. Even though they have a fair idea of what facts are, there
is a further differentiation to make-the difference between sub-
stantive and evidentiary facts.
Moreover, sometimes it is quite impossible to allege a cause
by stating facts. Let us illustrate. One, for instance, depends
on ownership as one of the elements of his case. May he allege
ownership? He may not, if he is confined merely to the pleading
12. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 764.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss4/2
1940] MISSOURI PRACTICE AND THE FEDERAL RULES 511
of facts. This word connotes, in part, the existence of legal
rights and duties. Thus, it is not a pure fact-word. But if one
cannot allege "ownership" of certain personalty, how can he
plead ownership? He cannot know the whole chain of title. The
result is that practical judges do the matter-of-fact thing. They
call "ownership" a fact-word.
Again, Judge Valliant, in Reilly v. Cullen,13 said that one
could not properly plead the very words of an instrument sued
on, for that would be pleading evidentiary facts. This cannot be
right, for evidentiary facts in this respect are facts that go to
prove broader facts. Yet the instrument, in a case like this,
would not be used to prove broader facts. The court would want
to look at the terms of the instrument for some of the last border
of facts (final, ultimate, or substantive facts) to determine the
rights and duties of the parties to the action.
It is clear that reform of procedure here will be of great
benefit. Whether that reform, however, is to be in the pattern
of the new Rules may be questionable. Yet, why should one be
compelled to do more than to make a short and plain statement
of his claim or defense? Under such a rule one must state all
the elements of his cause of action or defense. The difficulty
with the new Federal Rule on this matter seems to be its con-
nection with the forms. A few of them are so sketchy that to
some it may seem that they do not really contain all the elements
of causes and defenses. This is doubtful, but if those reforming
state procedure want to prepare sample pleadings to accompany
new rules or statutes there is no reason why they should not
amplify the federal forms.
Pleadings-Alternate, Hypothetical, and without Knowledge
or Information. Rule 8(e) (1) permits alternative and hypo-
thetical pleading. Alternative pleading is common in state pro-
cedure, and is helpful, but hypothetical pleading is not provided
for in many jurisdictions. However, it may be helpful, for one
may not be sure of his ground. To allow him to plead alterna-
tively or hypothetically may save time and expense. It is advis-
able to permit these methods of pleading. Pleading lack of
knowledge or information, which is permitted by Rule 8 (b) and
Section 776, may allow one to delay a case unnecessarily. Yet,
13. (1900) 159 Mo. 322, 60 S. NV. 126.
14. E. g., R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 798.
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since this practice is so firmly entrenched and since it often may
be honestly used, it should be retained.
General Denials. In most jurisdictions, general denials are
permitted to be used freely without being verified.15 This is a
pernicious rule. Any lawyer who has practiced law for only a
short time can recall instances when such general denials have
been used to obstruct justice. Rule 8 (b) happily curtails the use
of general denials to cases in which all the averments of the
pleading are attacked including allegations relating to jurisdic-
tion. This will result in the use of very few general denials to
complaints. The Federal Rules do not go so far as to require the
verification of all pleadings. On the other hand, Rule 11 does
make lawyers subject to "appropriate disciplinary action" if
they sign pleadings knowing that there is no good ground to
support them. This is a better solution, probably, of the prob-
lem of false pleadings than to require every pleading to be veri-
fied, for it might be difficult to draft, with proper exceptions, and
administer a law providing for general verification of pleadings.
Affirmative Defenses. Rule 8(c) names various defenses
which, it declares, should be deemed affirmative defenses. This
is seldom done in state law, though the federal example is fol-
lowed in section 43(4) of the Illinois Practice Act. If such a
rule will work, it will be helpful, for a defendant's lawyer will
know just what to do in many instances in which he was form-
erly doubtful.
But already, under the federal law, doubt has arisen as to
whether contributory negligence relates to substantive or ad-
jective law. In Illinois the rule is that the proof of the lack of
such negligence is part of the plaintiff's case when he bases his
recovery on the defendant's negligence. Therefore, the Rules,
which cannot deal with substantive law according to the act
authorizing them, cannot make contributory negligence an
affirmative defense according to one decision. 1G This decision
has been questioned on the ground that the Supreme Court has
15. E. g., R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 776.
16. Francis v. Humphrey (D. C. E. D. Ill. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 1. It was
recently held that Rule 8 (c), defining contributory negligence as an affirma-
tive defense to be pleaded by the defendant, is only a rule of procedure and
does not affect burden of proof. Sampson v. Channell (1940) 8 U. S. L.
Week 599.
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passed on this matter and decided that the whole question of
what affirmative defenses are, is procedural. 17
C. When Answered
Rule 12(a) establishes definite times within which one must
answer an opponent's pleading. In Missouri'18 and some other
states the answer is, at least in part, governed by court terms.
The writer has no doubt that the federal practice is the better.
It speeds up the forming of issues.
Under the Missouri procedure, if one fails to serve a petition
within the statutory number of days before the beginning of a
term the defendant need not answer until the beginning of the
second term after the service of the petition. This should be
deemed intolerable. This does not mean that there should be no
terms of court for any purpose. It may be necessary to retain
terms for trial purposes in circuits when a single judge holds
terms of court in different localities at various times during a
year. However, it would be better to do away with terms en-
tirely. Then a court could do its work whenever and wherever
it could best be accomplished.
D. How Answered
Rule 12 (b) states that every defense in law or fact to a claim
for relief shall be asserted in the responsive pleading, if one is
required, except that named defenses may, at the option of the
pleader, be made by motion. The meaning of this is not clear.
Does it permit one by answer or motion to raise questions of
either law or fact? The wording impels an affirmative reply. If
that solution to the inquiry is correct, an answer or a motion
may have the effect of an ordinary answer, motion, or demurrer.
The cases in relation to motions are not harmonious. It has
been decided that a motion to dismiss which requires considera-
tion of matter not appearing in the complaint is analogous to a
speaking demurrer and should be overruled. 9 But a later case
has declared that facts appearing in affidavits, depositions, and
answers to interrogatories may be considered in the disposition
of a motion to dismiss.0 As to answers, it has been said that
17. Note (1939) 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 510.
18. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 769.
19. McConville v. District of Columbia (D. C. D. C. 1938) 26 F. Supp.
295.
20. Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp.
(D. C. N. D. Ala. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 386.
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failure to state a claim for relief may be raised as an affirmative
defense in the answer.2'1 If one is to be allowed to take advantage
of defenses either by answer or motion whether or not those
defenses appear on the face of a pleading, the statute or rule
permitting this should state the existence of the privilege in no
uncertain terms. Therefore, if the policy of this Rule is adopted
in state procedure, the meaning of the Rule should be clarified.
There is a real advantage in such a practice. Any mistake in
the choice of method of attack upon a pleading would be harm-
less. Certainly the usual state practice confines the attack upon
pleadings by motions or demurrers to defects plain upon the face
of the pleadings, while answers consist of denials and affirmative
defenses. The writer inclines toward the adoption of the Federal
Rule, if clarified, for state procedure.
E. Consolidation of Motions
The time- and cost-saving device of consolidating in one mo-
tion nearly all of the grounds therefor existing when a motion is
made is provided in Rule 12 (g). The writer finds no statute or
rule definitely requiring such consolidation in Missouri. It is
an improvement which should be adopted.
F. Motions to Make More Certain
Rule 12 (e) permits the court to grant a motion for a more
definite statement or a bill of particulars. Section 785 likewise
allows the court to require a pleading to be made definite and
certain. This privilege should be retained in state law. One
difficulty that arises in relation to the Rule is that it is connected
with forms. If the forms are sufficient, why should one be al-
lowed a bill of particulars to amplify them? Are these bills of
any value except in case the new forms are not used? One case
suggests, but does not surely give, an affirmative answer to this
question.22 The way to avoid this trouble is to state definitely
that the court may grant the right to bills of particulars in all
cases.
G. Counterclaims
Rule 13(a) requires a party, either defendant or plaintiff, to
counterclaim any cause of action not the subject of a pending
21. Goodman v. United States (D. C. S. D. Iowa 1939) 28 F. Supp. 497.
22. Lost Trail, Inc. v. Allied Mills, Inc. (D. C. E. D. Ill. 1938) 26 F.
Supp. 98.
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action which the pleader has against any opposing party if his
claim arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim ana does not re-
quire for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Rule 13 (b) permits the
counterclaiming of any other cause one may have against an
opposing party. Section 777 allows counterclaiming of a claim
existing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff, between
whom a several judgment might be had in the action, if it is a
cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set
forth in the petition as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim,
or if the cause of action is connected with the subject of the
action with which the plaintiff's claim is connected. Also, one
contract action may be counterclaimed against another contract
action if the counterclaimed cause exists when the plaintiff sues.
At a glance, one can see the great difference between the
federal and state law. Under the Federal Rule there is compul-
sory counterclaim and the broadest possible power to counter-
claim, if one so desires. Plaintiffs may counterclaim. Under the
state statute the authority to counterclaim is much less extensive,
and only defendants may counterclaim. Moreover, the lawyers
are very uncertain about the meaning of "subject of the action."
This leads to a variety of results in different jurisdictions. The
Federal Rule certainly is the procedure to adopt, since it gives
much greater promise of saving of time, energy, and expense
than does the state law.
H. Cross-Claims
Rule 13(g) accords a party the privilege of suing a co-party
on a claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the original action or of a counterclaim in
the proceeding. Missouri permits one a cross-claim against a
co-party only when this cross-claim also amounts to a defense
to the plaintiff's petition. The Federal Rule is the one to adopt,
since it will result in fewer lawsuits.
I. Third-Party Practice
Rule 14 grants one the privilege of bringing in as parties third
persons who are, or may be, liable to him or his opponent for all
or part of the opponent's claim against him. No such practice
exists in Missouri. It should exist, however, for the power to try
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the obligations of such third-parties would eliminate a lot of
unnecessary litigation.
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
Rule 16 is one of the most valuable of all the rules. It permits
a trial judge to require the attorneys for the parties to appear
before him to consider the problems of the pending lawsuit with
the view to removing all unnecessary issues and questions, and
to aid in a quick and inexpensive, though fair, disposition of
the suit.
There is no Missouri statute providing for this procedure.
This deficiency should be remedied. This has just been recom-
mended by the Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure of the Bar
Association of St. Louis.23 That committee believes that a trial
court may, under Section 1953 institute this practice under the
power there given to make rules of procedure. This statute
should not be relied upon. Definite authority should be granted.
Moreover, the Federal Rule should not be followed exactly. In-
stead of permitting pre-trial practice, it should be made com-
pulsory, and trial courts should be permitted to appoint masters
to aid them. The matter of providing for pre-appeal practice
should also be investigated.
PARTIES
A. Real Parties in Interest
Rule 17 and Sections 698 and 699 have approximately the
same content. They permit the real party in interest and certain
legal title holders to sue. By real parties in interest are usually
meant those who have a right to the fruits of the proceeding.
In Missouri these statutes have been interpreted narrowly. Thus,
it has been said that in strictly legal actions such as ejectment
equitable title holders could not sue.24 Again, it has been decided
that, where several insurance companies have paid an entire
loss, they could not sue a wrongdoer, for the legal title to any
claim against him remained with the insured.25 Such unfair and
costly results should be rectified when the state practice is re-
modeled.
23. [Since this article was written, the Bar Association of St. Louis has
declined to approve the recommendation of its Committee.-EDITOR.]
24. Bailey v. Winn (1890) 101 Mo. 649, 12 S. W. 1045.
25. Swift & Co. v. Wabash R. R. (1910) 149 Mo. App. 526, 131 S. W. 124.
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B. Joinder of Parties
Although both Rule 19 (a) and Section 702 require the joinder
of all necessary parties (those whose interest will be effected by
the judgment in an action), Rule 20 (a) and Sections 700 and
701, relating to permissive joinder of parties, differ greatly.
The Federal Rule permits all persons to be joined as plaintiffs
or defendants who assert, or have asserted against them, any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transac-
tion, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, if, in
addition to this connection, there is any question of law or fact
common to all of the parties which will arise in the action. A
party need not be interested in obtaining or defending against
all the relief demanded. The state law allows all persons to be
joined as plaintiffs who have an interest in the subject of the
action, and in obtaining the relief demanded. Any person may
be a defendant who has or claims an interest in the controversy
adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a necessary party to the com-
plete determination or settlement of the question involved.
One need merely look at the last paragraph to realize the
narrowness of the Missouri law, especially as to plaintiffs, when
compared with the federal practice. Some may believe that the
new Rule is altogether too broad and is not desirable. The writer
would also reach that conclusion if it were not for the fact that
Rule 20(b) permits a court to order separate trials or make
other orders to prevent delay or prejudice. The state law surely
needs to be altered. Can the Federal Rule be safely adopted in
place of the local practice? Certainly it may be, in the light of
Rule 20 (b).
The wording of Section 700, relating to the joinder of plain-
tiffs, has been too little understood, and therefore too narrowly
interpreted to countenance its retention. As has been stated,
lawyers are not at all in accord as to the meaning of subject of
the action. Moreover, many courts believe that, under a statute
like Section 700, the plaintiffs must each have an interest in all
the relief requested. These problems should not exist, for the
subject of the action is not difficult to pick out. It is, properly,
the tangible or intangible thing which is peculiar to the particu-
lar case and around which the lawsuit revolves. Thus, the con-
tract is the subject of the action when one sues in relation
thereto; one's reputation is the subject of the action in a slander
or libel suit; one's person is the subject of the action in a suit for
Washington University Open Scholarship
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assault and battery; and the marriage relationship is the sub-
ject of the action in a divorce proceeding. Again, the statute
plainly says that each plaintiff need merely have an interest in
the relief requested. But many courts hold each plaintiff must
have an interest in all of the relief requested. Each has this
interest when all that is demanded is an injunction, for each
plaintiff wants all of the injunction. But, if money damages are
requested, each plaintiff may have an interest only in part of
the relief asked for. Hence, they cannot join. This is the Mis-
souri law. 26
Not only do we find such holdings relating to the joinder of
plaintiffs, but some courts hold that when defendants are joined
in tort cases the relief requested against each one must be all of
the recovery demanded. Again, this is the local law.27 There is
absolutely no justification for this result, for there is no refer-
ence to the relief requested in the statute relating to the joinder
of defendants. The defendants in these cases must be jointly
liable, as they are permitted to be sued jointly in actions in
which the only judgment requested is one for an injunction. A
typical case is that in which it is claimed that several defendants
have jointly caused the pollution of a stream.
INTERPLEADER AND INTERVENTION
Interpleader 28 and intervention2 are allowed under both the
federal and Missouri practice. Although the ordinary state prac-
tice relating to these matters may be adequate, it would be wise
to have provisions similar to the Federal Rules dealing with
these matters. Of course, the rule covering intervention, as far
as it relates to federal statutes conferring rights to intervene,
would have to be revamped. The state rule should allow a very
broad right to intervene.
CLASS ACTIONS
Rule 23 is the ultimate in liberality, to date, in allowing class
actions, that is, in allowing less than all of a given class to
26. Breimeyer v. Star Bottling Co. (1909) 136 Mo. App. 84, 117 S. W.
119.
27. State v. Dearing (1912) 244 Mo. 25, 148 S. W. 618.
28. Rule 22, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States; 28 U. S. C. A. (1927) sec. 41 (26); R. S. Mo. (1929) sees.
1316, 1325, 1326, 1332, 1404, 1405, 1407, 2535-2538, -5384, 14390, 14450,
14452.
29. Rule 24, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 701.
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represent the entire class in a lawsuit. This Rule has rendered a
service in definitely indicating that a class action is not permitted
unless the class is so large that it would be impracticable to bring
every member thereof before the court and unless there is some
connection among all of such members. However, the writer be-
lieves that possibly the Rule goes too far in merely requiring, as
the essential common interest among the class members, that
there be a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief be sought. Yet, it would be well to
try out this formula.
In Missouri there is no statute providing for class actions.
Therefore, they are permitted only under the equity law. Pro-
visions should be made for class actions in both law and equity
actions. The Federal Rule, as far as it is applicable, might well
be adopted in the first instance. Of course, Rule 23 (b) (2),
which says, in relation to secondary actions by shareholders, that
the verification of the complaint must state that the proceeding
is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on the federal court,
which would not otherwise have jurisdiction, would not apply in
a state court.
TRIAL BY JURY OR COURT
A. Right to Jury Trial
Rules 38 and 39 state the methods of obtaining a jury trial.
Section 950 indicates how one waives a jury in Missouri state
courts. The rules and the statute apply different philosophies.
The idea of the Federal Rules appears to be that juries should be
eliminated where possible. Therefore, Rule 38 provides that un-
less one makes a formal demand for a jury, he waives the right
to one. The Missouri law, on the other hand, grants one a jury,
where juries are allowed, unless one waives his right. Experi-
ence, we are convinced, has taught that fair results can be gained
by court trials at much less expense than is required by jury
proceedings. Therefore, if one desires a jury, let him take the
affirmative and make a formal demand for one.
Rule 39 (c) goes so far as to permit the court in an equity case
to allow a jury, whose verdict shall have the same effect as if
trial by jury were a matter of right. It should be noticed that
this use of a jury is authorized only if the parties and court con-
sent thereto. In remolding the state law, it would be worthwhile
to try out the new federal practice.
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B. Jurors
Rule 47 (b) states that a court may direct the impanelling of
one or two alternate jurors. There is no such provision in
Missouri law. The discretionary power to have alternate jurors
added to the regular panel should be a part of every jury system.
Even the new Federal Rule can be improved. There is no good
reason why the number of such jurors should be confined to two.
Nor should the service of such jurors be ended when the jury
retires, for a juror might become unable to serve after the retire-
ment of a jury following a long trial.
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Rule 41, in general, permits the voluntary dismissal of an ac-
tion without an order of court only if a notice of dismissal is
filed before service of the answer, or if the parties who have
appeared generally in the action agree thereto. Section 960
allows such a dismissal at any time before a case is submitted to
a jury or to a court. The Federal Rule represents the more hon-
est practice and should be adopted by the states which have the
present Missouri rule. In fact, it would be an advantage to state
procedure to include the outline of dismissal in one rule or
statute, as has been done under Rule 41. There one finds, in
addition to the provision already discussed, material relating to
involuntary dismissals, dismissal of counterclaims, cross-claims,
and third-party claims, as well as costs.
EVIDENCE
A. In General
When the Federal Rules were being formulated, the question
arose whether evidence could, or should, be dealt with under the
authorization given the Supreme Court of the United States to
make rules of procedure. The writer has outlined elsewhere"
his reasons for thinking that the courts of a state have inherent
power to make rules governing their procedure, including rules
dealing with evidence. Professor Tyrrell Williams has written a
clear article setting forth the opposite philosophy.31 However,
in Missouri we are not at this time confronted with this prob-
lem, since the supreme court is merely presenting a statement
30. Wheaton, Courts and Rule-making Powers (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. 261.
31. Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Pro-
cedure (1927) 22 WASHINGTON U. LAW QuARTERLY 459.
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of law to be passed upon by the legislature, which believes it has
the authority to make evidentiary statutes or to authorize evi-
dentiary rules of court.
The new Federal Rules do not go into the law of evidence ex-
tensively. Rule 43, however, deals with the admissibility of evi-
dence in general. Its form would not permit its adoption as state
law, since it says that the more liberal law, state or federal,
should apply to the admission of evidence. We believe that the
states should reexamine their evidence law, eliminate all unjust
rules, and liberalize evidence to the greatest extent possible to
the existence of fair trials. It would be well to experiment with a
code or set of evidence rules. We should begin now thoroughly to
test the idea that all relevant evidence, subject to the court's
discretion, should be admissible. This means, for instance, that
privileges of witnesses should be curtailed and the use of hearsay
evidence broadened.
The American Law Institute is preparing a model code. Some
states should give it a trial. We believe that those who do will
never regret taking the step.
B. Discovery
Rules 26 through 37 include a comprehensive plan of discov-
ery. Rules 26 through 33 cover depositions. It is not advisable
here to go into them in detail. It should be noticed, however,
that the scope of examination includes anything not privileged
which is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.
Further, these rules deal very thoroughly with the method of
taking depositions either before or after an action is begun and
with the use of depositions after they are taken.
The present Missouri lawS2 concerning depositions is liberal
and lawyers appear to get along very well with the present
method of taking depositions. Yet, if we are to enter upon a
campaign to improve our procedural law, we should consider
carefully the Federal Rules relating to depositions in order that
we may discover whether they would serve us as well as, or
better than, the present state statutes. If they would, they should
be adopted so that there may be but one system of taking deposi-
tions in state and federal courts.
32. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 1753-1784, 1789-1806.
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EXCEPTIONS TO RULINGS
Rule 46 says that formal exceptions to rulings of a court are
unnecessary, but that it shall be sufficient for a party, at the
time the ruling is made, to make known to the court the action
he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the
party and the grounds therefor. If a party has no opportunity
to object to a ruling when it is made, the absence of an objection
shall not prejudice him. The difference between an exception
and an objection is not clear. Perhaps it consists in a difference
in the use of the word "object" and "except." It scarcely seems
that men of the caliber of the advisory committee of the Supreme
Court would suggest such a meaningless change. Yet it seems
that the rule calls for some objection to rulings which one claims
are incorrect.
However, it already has been held that exceptions will be
assumed as taken.33 It has also been declared that it is enough
for a court to advise a party that exceptions will be allowed to
any adverse rulings.34 These rulings appear to abrogate the
wording of the rule. Our Missouri law provides for exceptions,
with the possibility of the court's permitting an agreement be-
fore trial that exceptions should be automatically saved.
Should the practice of raising exceptions be abolished? The
writer thinks they should be. Lawyers, especially beginners, may
well forget to make and save exceptions. On appeal, the appellee
can be thoroughly warned by appellant's abstract and brief of
the objections raised by the appellant.
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Rule 56 permits summary judgments. These are judgments
permitted without a trial when the court is convinced that there
is no real issue involved. This Rule is very broad. There is no
limit to the type of case in which such a judgment is permissible,
and both plaintiffs and defendants may obtain such a judgment.
This law should be adopted by Missouri and every other state in
the United States which does not have as liberal a summary
judgment provision. Such a law prevents untold delay and ex-
pense.
33. United States v. Natl Biscuit Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1938) 25 F.
Supp. 329.
34. First Nat'l Bank v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 907.
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APPEAL
Rules 73 through 76 furnish an admirable, uncomplicated
method of appeal to circuit courts of appeals. To begin with,
any losing party may appeal, the practice of summons and sever-
ance and separate appeal by those severally interested having
been abolished. Moreover, there is but one method of appeal.
The basic essential to an appeal is the filing of a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the appellate court. The clerk then notifies
those parties who do not appeal from the judgment that the
notice has been filed. A cost bond is filed unless one is permitted
to take a pauper's oath. A supersedeas bond is provided if one
wishes to stay execution until appeal.
The appellate record is prepared by the clerk. Its content is
based upon instructions of the different parties (or by a stipula-
tion of the parties as to the proper contents of the record) and
upon named portions of the trial record, if they are not covered
by the requests of the parties. The testimony may be in narra-
tive or question and answer form, unless the latter form is
requested by the appellee. If the appellee demands the question
and answer form of the evidence which has already been ade-
quately drafted in narrative form, he may be forced to pay the
costs.
There need be no bill of exceptions, and no approval of the
record is necessary unless the parties disagree as to what is a
true record. It is possible to have a record prepared for an
appellate hearing on any intermediate order. The record on
appeal is filed and the action is docketed with the clerk of the
appellate court.
Sections 1018 through 1069 provide the appellate procedure
for Missouri state courts. Those who are familiar with this
practice can readily see how much more complicated our method
of appeal is than that now effective in the federal courts. We
require summons and severance before fewer than all the losing
parties having joint interests can appeal. We retain appeals and
writs of error. We still require printed bills of exceptions and
the approval of such bills, unless the bill is filed during vacation.
Why should these practices be continued? What need is there
for different methods of taking a case from one court to another
on appeal? Would it not be much better to have one simple
method of appeal which could be used, for the most part, either
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in a state or federal circuit court of appeals? The suggested
answers to these questions can lead to but one result, the adop-
tion of the new rules on appeals from federal district courts to
federal circuit courts of appeals.
This paper has not attempted a comparison of every Federal
Rule with the corresponding state law, for on many subjects our
state law and that covered by the Rules are substantially the
same. The purpose of the writer has been to present variations
between the two procedural systems which he considers impor-
tant, and to suggest changes in state procedure which he believes
may improve the state practice. On the whole, the new Federal
Rules could be adopted with great profit to the law of many
states, thereby providing a much better practice and eliminating
a duplicity of procedure.
A splendid opportunity is now presented in Missouri for this
state to be a testing ground. What a glorious thing it would be
if supreme court and legislature, working together harmoniously,
should give us an improved modern procedure in at least the
fields covered by the new Federal Rules! There can be no doubt
that our supreme court favors improved practice. It desires to
eliminate undue delay and expense in litigation. Yet it is a prac-
tical body of men. It will, therefore, surely recommend to the
legislature those changes in our procedure which it thinks are
essential to the expedition of cases at the most reasonable ex-
pense, and which it believes the lawmaking body of our state
will approve.
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